No. 29

World – real and ideal Objects.

<The natural core of the appearing world of realities and the worldliness of the ideal objectivities>[[1]](#footnote-1)

*<Content:> The structural set of types of the pregiven world – its structure of identity. Appearing world as such: Identical core which makes possible the grasping of identity in the relativities of different apperceptions with different being sense. Its essential form; but two layers of essential forms. On the one hand form of the core, on the other hand form of the human, mental contents, separated according to subject groups. Ways of appearance belonging to the single subjects, and those of intersubjective experience.*

<§1. The structure of identity of the pregiven intersubjectively to be experienced world, and both its layers of essential forms: forms of the natural core and forms of the cultural determination. Unconditionally objective and relatively objective world truth>

The world, the universe of the pregiven for us as being; in particular world as universe of the **real** objects, “real” the single pregiven mundane. The grounding of the “realities”. The **concrete real**, which is pregiven in the way that its thematic experience does not need the **thematic** experience of someone else in advance. The concrete precedes the abstract, [precedes] the independently experienceable within the experience. Does one also have to say: “The singular unity precedes the multiplicity – in the thematic experience”? But concrete multiplicities are still experienced. Real unity and multiplicity – a relative difference; the unity can already be abstract.

**Last concretes**. “Last” does not designate “atoms”. A last thing is a single thing. But it is separable, dividable. Division **[295]** is one of the possible ways of “change” in the widest sense, whereby a concrete unity is divided into a concrete multiplicity. Does each part come from division? Is a branch a part? Is a stone a last concrete? Not rather the earth? And is the earth a last concrete and not rather a part, etc.? Does this relativity lead towards an actually last thing, at least within the realm of mere experience? Does not something become a part (which has previously been grasped as something in itself) without the whole having been previously experienced, and [without] partition having to have separated the part? There thus exploration is needed.

Anyway, the above concept of the concrete real thing is not concerned. The **structural set of types** of the pregiven world, **its structure of identity** which makes possible identity of an all-common world for us, for anyone in general. We identify the same thing, but we also say: Different men, different peoples, etc., grasp the same (experienced by them as the same) thing in different ways.

World for me, for us Germans, etc. in such a circle of humanity, in which we communicate, I and anyone else, and [in which we] have the same being world, the same objects as verifying themselves <as> identical within our experiential community. This identity of experience does not preclude that the objective sense, in which I and the other one experience the same, is a different one. But if the common identity shall be verifiable, then an identical core of content, and objectively identical must be implied within the content of inner properties of the same for me and **for anyone** within that which I <experience> and which the other one experiences. And thus the same world has for us all purely as world of common harmonious experience something **unconditionally objective**, beyond which determinations are still **open**, which change in a **subjective way** (or rather, according to the special communities, in which I <am> and the other one is, and in which the common objective sense constitutes itself). Within the experience of the community, but limited to these communities, these properties also verify themselves and belong to the content of the true being of the corresponding realities for its members – for them, these men. The products of the cultural world belong there. But now the world as world of experience of any men has always and necessarily such properties; and these have themselves a **universal form** as predicates of an experiential world for men. Thus we have **two layers of essential forms**:

1) The form of the core of the unconditionally objective predicates, which obviously make possible in an unconditional way the identification of something worldly, which simply ground the individual identity of the real as being unconditionally experienceable in general.

2) The form, which beyond that belongs to the intersubjectively experienceable realities with regard to the determinations, which belong to the concrete content of the respectively experienced and experienceable as such, which necessarily must have the same individual content within their essential set of types, but still not for everyone the same special, the same individual content.

Still it needs to be heeded that we are speaking of the property content which can be verified for the experiencing one (partly unconditionally in general for any conceivable as such, partly only individually for him or commonly within a special community) in experience. This thus concerns the **objective sense of experience**, the ontic content, property content. On the other hand, each object and each property of the object (each truly being) has its subjective, its **intentionally constituting modes of experiential givenness**, its ways of appearance having their essential shapes without which the harmonious experience as experience of the corresponding object is inconceivable in its objective sense. Thus each object is accordingly and according to each property also to be equipped with relative properties, namely <those> in which from the ontic is recurred towards the ways of givenness of the ontic.

Thus to each mundane an unconditionally general structure of essence of its intentional-constitutive properties does belong, and this parts according to that twofold stratification of the objective sense according to the essential form of “modes of appearance” belonging to the unconditionally objective core content, and into the essential form of those modes of givenness in which that changing surplus presents itself.

We have to distinguish for the modes of appearance: those (in their essential form) belonging to the **singly** to be experienced subjects, and we then find belonging to them differences of the **[297]** single-personal normality and abnormality; but furthermore with regard to the **common** experience the essential form of the intersubjective modes of givenness within the intersubjective synthesis, thus here the form of the intersubjective normality and abnormality. These questions concern each of both layers in itself.

If we describe the world as world of human experience, as what is concretely experienced within the experience of each human being, as the same within mutual communication – although not everyone experiences the same with the same objective content -, then it needs to be distinguished between non-agreement of the different subjects under the title of the contrast of truth and illusion, and the non-agreement based on the relativity of the intersubjective truth, insofar as it can be relative towards some special subjectivity (single subjectivity and intersubjectivity). But now also relative truth of the last kind – like that of an understood instrument – is **mediately** experienceable for everyone, cognizable (like through consent in a foreign historical culture). Apart from the truth as objective truth with regard to the world itself directed towards that which is **unconditionally objective** for everyone, we also have a universal truth, directed towards the **relative objective**, insofar as it is accessible for everyone in this relativity as the relatedness towards special subject groups.

But here the following difference is needed:

Everyone experiences the world and the concrete objects of the world, and, if he is not subject to an illusion, the same true objects. However this identity may be compatible within the experience with relativity towards special subjects, we can derive an **Apriori** without dividing both essential structures: Everyone experiences a world and in community the same world and everyone experiences it in a universally same structure as a multiplicity and a unified multiplicity of concrete realities; and these realities are subject to a **universal set of types**: mere things, anorganic and organic ones, animals and men as egoically living beings, these living in communities, etc. Then one singles out the absolutely identical objective structure. Thus one has (physical and organic) nature as sublayer of all realities: **[298]** men (and animals) governing as egoical, personal unities, firmly related towards physical-organic bodies, communities as multiplicities of bodies, but united through intersubjective combination.

<§2.> Ideal and real objectivities.

<Persons and personal communities. Free and bound idealities>[[2]](#footnote-2)

(Transcendental ideality of all conceivable objects of possible worlds, insofar the transcendental subjects and their transcendental mental processes, their transcendental peculiarities are called “real”.[[3]](#footnote-3) But why are they called “ideal”?)

The world (any possible world) as universe of “realities”.[[4]](#footnote-4) All those mundane objects (within the frame of the objects as such, which are transcendentally ideal considered in an absolute way, as I said), which are individuated within the spatio-temporality as form of the world (form of all mundane objects) through spatiotemporal locality under the title “real object” do count to the world here. **Ideal objects within the world** have a spatiotemporal presence, but they can be present at many spatio-temporal places at the same time, and still numerically as identically the same.[[5]](#footnote-5)

It essentially belongs to the presence of ideal objects that they are subjective formations (e.g. formations of categorial or [of] a related activity of the emotion), thus are located within the worldliness (spatio-temporality) through the locality of the subjects. But they can be generated at different time-points of the same subject as identically the same, as the same with respect to the repeated generations, and likewise as the same with respect to the generations of different subjects.

**[299]** **Ideal objectivities occur in the world**, are discovered, can, after having been discovered, be thought anew, and [can be] thought any number of times, and be experienced in their kind as such. But if it is understood that: They have been “accepted” even **before** they have been discovered, or they are simply to be assumed as generable at any time – insofar as there are subjects within it [within time], or are conceivable, which they had the ability to generate – and have their mode of **all-time existence**: **they would be the same in all possible generations**. Likewise it is understood: Mathematical and other ideal objects “exist” which nobody has constructed. Their existence certainly is just approved by their construction (their “experience”); but the construction of the already known [objects] foreshadows a horizon of further to be discovered, although as yet unknown ones.

As long as ideal objects are not discovered (by anyone) they de facto do not exist within spatio-temporality; and insofar as it is possible (it needs not to be decided in how far this is possible), that they will never be discovered, and would never have been discovered, they would not possess any world actuality. But anyway, if they are actualized or “realized”, they are also **spatio-temporally localized**, but certainly just in such a way that this localization does not actually **individuate** them. That a subject is thinking a sentence in an evident way, bestows locality to the sentence, and a single one as thought by this thinker, etc., but not to the sentence pure and simple, which would be **the same** as being thought at different times, etc.

An ideal object can **de facto** have a single worldliness like **Raffael’s** Madonna, and cannot be repeatable in sufficient identity (of the complete ideal content). But this ideal is still essentially repeatable, like “Faust” now.

**Persons** are **real**, they are worldly essentially in the relation of governing within one single real body. Likewise **personal communities are real despite the free change of place** of the people involved; they simply do not have a singular body, but a multiplicity of bodies and thereby a localization within spatio-temporality of the kind a multiplicity has it. Thus a people is real, as people a mundane multiple-unitary reality. A state (a state’s people) has a peculiar localization, **[300]** insofar as it has a territory as a real sphere of land in which it has its domain.

The **constitution** has an ideality, insofar as it is a categorial objectivity, an expression of the state’s will, or rather, of the state obligatory, which is reactivatable, repeatable, understandable by different persons, and identifiable at different times. But within its relation to a certain worldly state’s people and its territory this ideal again has its reality of an own kind. The repeatability (reactivatability) by anyone means that anyone can repeat it in his sense of ought, which is only identical with relation to the worldly locality.[[6]](#footnote-6)

But now we see that also cultural formations are not completely free idealities, and that we in general have to distinguish between **free idealities** (like the logical-mathematical formations and the pure essential structures of any kind), and the **bound idealities**, carrying reality in their being sense, and thereby belonging to the real world. All reality here is attributed to the spatio-temporality, that is, as form of the individual. But originally it belongs to nature. The world as world of realities has its individuality from nature as its deepest layer.[[7]](#footnote-7)

1. Probably 1929. – Editor’s note. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. At the beginning of this paragraph there is a note written with a pencil by Landgrebe “used in Logical Studies”. The “Logical studies” are Landgrebe’s edited work *Experience and Judgment*, where the corresponding paragraph is worked into § 65. – Editor’s note. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Real in contrast to transcendentally-ideal. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Mundane-real. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. What does this concept of „ideal“ have to do with the speaking of „transcendental ideality“? [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Proper reactivatability by the citizen, improper by someone external.

   In a sociality as a community of will the general scheme “**man as subject for the world, man as object within the world**” comes back in a special way. The citizenship is subject of the state legality, in this regard it is will-subject, insofar as it is only the citizen (at least primarily) who carries the state’s will within his civic willing (direction of will), is the functionary of the same. On the other hand, each citizen is object, he is subject to the state’s laws. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. 1) Free idealities are not bound to any territory; they have their territory within the universe, and in each possible universe (they are all-spatial and all-temporal). 2) Bound idealities are bound to earth, bound to Mars, bound to special territories, etc. But certainly the free [idealities] are de facto worldly in a historical-territorial occurring. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)